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WTASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
Causation in Heart Cases. Whether a heart attack and resulting
disability is compensable under the Workman's Compensation Act
depends on whether such an attack is the result of an industrial
injury. "Injury" is defined in the Workman's Compensation Act as
follows:
Injury means a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature,
producing an immediate or prompt result, and occurring from without;
an occupational disease; and such physical condition as results from
either."
Claims for heart attacks are allowed on the basis of a traumatic
happening rather than on the basis of occupational disease.2
The Supreme Court of Washington has set up the following re-
quirements for a recovery in a heart case under the Workman's
Compensation Act:
1. An immediate or prompt result;
2. A tangible happening occurring from without; and
3. A causal relationship showing that the happening caused the
attack to occur when it did occur and without which the attack
would not have occurred when it did.'
In the case of Mork v. Department of Labor and Industries,4 the
Washington court set out a further explanation of the causal relation-
ship necessary for a recovery for an industrial injury in a heart case.
The court ruled that to be compensable under the Workman's Com-
pensation Act, a heart attack must have a causal relationship to the
death of the workman, who otherwise would have lived for an
indefinite and unpredictable time.
In the Mork case, the workman complained at the plant office of
"gas in his stomach, up to his neck" (a frequent symptom of the onset
of a coronary occlusion). He then walked back up to his station
twenty-six feet above the ground. Twenty-five minutes later he was
found dead of a coronary occlusion. Atherosclerosis had been present
in an advanced stage for several years.
The claimant, Minnie Mork, applied for a widow's pension, which
3 RCW 51.08.100.
2 Higgins v. Department of Labor and Industries, 27 Wn.2d 816, 180 P.2d 559 (1947),
and cases cited therein.3 Petersen v. Department of Labor and Industries, 40 Wn.2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161
(1952).4 148 Wash. Dec. 67, 291 P.2d 650 (1955).
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was awarded to her by the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance. The
employer appealed and the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals re-
versed the Supervisor. The claimant appealed to superior court and
a judgment was entered for the claimant after a jury trial.
The claimant relied upon the deceased's climb from the office back
up to his station as constituting the compensable industrial injury
proximately contributing to the death of the workman. The supreme
court held that the act of the deceased in returning to his station was
not an industrial injury within the meaning of the Workman's Com-
pensation Act.
The Washington court in the past has been very liberal in granting
widow's pensions in heart cases. Some of the recoveries in these cases
have seemed contrary to the purpose of the Workman's Compensation
Act as a compensation system to avoid the inequities and deficiencies
of the common-law remedies for industrial accidents. The unfortunate
result of lenient recoveries in this field has led to an unusually large
number of litigated cases and also to a reluctance on the part of
employers to hire cardiac patients in industry
Much of the confusion in this field has resulted from a miscon-
ception of the rule stated in the case of McCormick Lumber Co. v.
Department of Labor and Industries, where the court said:
An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion
producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work,
whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of the workman's
health.6
This rule merely states that unusual strain or exertion is not
necessary to provide the "traumatic happening" required by the
statute defining "injury," and is not concerned with the matter of
causal relationship.
However, the application of the rule of the McCormick case has
resulted in recoveries in heart cases where the causal relationship was
doubtful, at best."
r See Rutledge, Proposed Procedure for Administering Heart Cases Under the
Vashington Industrial Insurance Act, 31 WAsH. L. RFv. 67 (1956) on the problem of
the employability of cardiacs in industry and a suggested program for improving the
administration of the Workman's Compensation Act in this area.
17 NVn2d 40, 59, 108 P2d 807, 815 (1941) ; noted in 16 WAsa. L. REv. 167 (1941).
7Guy F. Atkinson Company v. Webber, 15 Wn2d 579, 131 P2d 421 (1942). In this
case a widow's pension was allowed where the workman died while operating a bull-
dozer. No specific incident was relied upon and all the evidence showed that the
workman had a very bad heart condition and his death might have occurred at any
time. Northwest Metal Products v. Department of Labor and Industries, 12 Wn.2d
155, 120 P.2d 855 (1942). A recovery for disability was granted where a workman
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In the leading case of Petersen v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries,' the court indicated an intention to scrutinize more carefully
the causal relationship between the happening and the alleged injury
rather than to concentrate on the nature of the happening itself. The
court in that case said:
We have never held that the dependent of one who dies of heart trouble
is entitled to compensation because the onset of the attack occurred
while engaged in extra-hazardous employment. We have never dis-
pensed with a minimum showing that the employment must have
been more likely than not a contributing factor to the death, without
which the death would not have occurred when it did.9
The claimant in the Mork case, evidently relying on the broad
language of the above rule in the Petersen case, depended upon the
testimony of a doctor to the effect that the deceased workman would
have lived at least one minute longer if he not climbed the steps. The
court held that the theory that an acceleration of death of one minute
met the requirement of causation was unsound. The court stated:
Even in heart cases, compensability is not predicated upon principles
of ordinary life insurance... To be within the act, an industrial injury
must have a causal relationship to the death of the workman, who other-
wise would have lived for an indefinite and unpredictable time.10
The strong language of the court in the Mork case seems to
emphasize the trend of the court toward holding claimants to a higher
standard of proof of the causal relationship in heart cases. This seems
to be a desirable trend in keeping with the original purpose of the
Workman's Compensation Act as a compensation act rather than as
an insurance program.
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with rheumatic heart disease was disabled while doing his ordinary work on a crimping
machine. The medical testimony showed that the workman should not have been
working for the previous ten years. Summerlin v. Department of Labor and Industries,
8 Wn.2d 43, 111 P.2d 603 (1941). In this case a widow's pension was allowed where
the workman, who was suffering from extensive coronary heart disease, died while
doing his usual work of falling timber. He had jumped six feet onto a tree root.
840 Wn.2d 635, 640, 245 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1952). In this case, the court found that
rolling a barrel up an incline satisfied the statutory requirement of a happening but
held that nevertheless there was no injury within the statute as the claimant had failed
to show the casual relation between the happening and the heart attack.
9 40 Wn2d 635, 640, 245 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1952).
10 Mork v. Department of Labor and Industries, 148 Wash. Dec. 67, 69, 291 P.2d
650,652 (1955).
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